The Chief Justice Heads The Judiciary. The Prime Minister Advises On Who Gets The Job.

The Chief Justice of the Federal Court is the highest position in the Malaysian judicial system.

The office is established under Article 122 of the Federal Constitution, which provides that the Federal Court "shall consist of a president of the Court (to be styled 'the Chief Justice of the Federal Court'), of the President of the Court of Appeal, of the Chief Judges of the High Courts and, until the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by order otherwise provides, of eleven other judges" plus any additional judges under Clause (1A).

Current holder: Wan Ahmad Farid Wan Salleh, sworn in on 28 July 2025. He succeeded Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat — the first woman to hold the office — who served from 2019 until her retirement on 1 July 2025 without a tenure extension.

What the office actually does

Three distinct functions:

1. Head of the judiciary. Article 122(1) designates the Chief Justice as head of the judiciary, responsible for administrative leadership and institutional integrity.

2. Presiding judge of the apex court. The Chief Justice presides over the Federal Court, adjudicating final appeals on constitutional, civil and criminal matters — and the Federal Court exercises judicial review, scrutinising executive decisions for constitutional compliance.

3. A role in other appointments. The Chief Justice recommends appointments for other senior judges, though these require executive-endorsed royal assent.

The judicial hierarchy runs: Chief Justice, then the President of the Court of Appeal, then the Chief Judge of Malaya, then the Chief Judge of Sabah and Sarawak.

Practical details: the seat is the Palace of Justice, Putrajaya; the style is "Yang Amat Arif The Right Honourable"; retirement is at 66, with provision for a short extension on request; and the salary is reported at RM46,800 monthly. The inaugural holder was James Thompson, as Chief Justice of the Federation of Malaya in 1957.

How the appointment works

Article 122B(1) is the operative provision:

The Yang di-Pertuan Agong appoints the Chief Justice, acting on the Prime Minister's advice, after consulting the Conference of Rulers.

The same route applies to judges of the High Court, Court of Appeal and Federal Court, and to all four top judicial offices.

Before giving his advice, the Prime Minister must consult others — the Chief Justice and one of the other top three judges (President of the Court of Appeal, Chief Judge of Malaya, or Chief Judge of Sabah and Sarawak), depending on the position being filled.

On qualifications, the Constitution says remarkably little. Article 123 requires only that a person has been a lawyer, a member of Malaysia's judicial and legal services, or a member of a state legal service in the 10 years before appointment. It gives no other detail on how a judge is selected or what standards they should meet.

A structural safeguard worth noting: the Constitution fixes the number of judges for the superior courts, so that it is not easily possible for a government to pack the courts with political nominees.

Where the JAC fits

The Judicial Appointments Commission was created in February 2009 under Act 695.

Two things about it are commonly misunderstood:

It did not require a constitutional amendment. The JAC was established by ordinary parliamentary legislation, not by amending the Constitution.

It sits before Article 122B, not instead of it. The JAC's own materials describe the Act 695 process as "the process preceding the process of appointment under Article 122B" — its purpose being to make nomination, appointment and promotion of superior court judges more transparent and comprehensive.

So the constitutional route is unchanged. The JAC adds a recommendation layer ahead of it.

Why this is contested

We are setting this out because it is a live public debate, and both positions are argued seriously.

The criticism. Commentators including Professor James Chin have argued that public confidence in the judiciary cannot be restored unless the Prime Minister is entirely removed from the JAC process, the underlying issue being that Article 122B(1) grants the Prime Minister considerable influence over judicial appointments. Academic commentary describes the arrangement as underscoring executive influence over judicial leadership while nominally preserving monarchical oversight.

Litigation has run the other way too. In April 2025, a lawyer filed suit asking the High Court to declare the JAC Act unconstitutional and invalid, and to order the Prime Minister to follow the Article 122B process without JAC "interference" — arguing, in effect, that the statutory layer improperly constrains the constitutional one.

So the JAC is challenged from both directions: as giving the executive too much influence, and as unconstitutionally displacing the executive's constitutional role.

Historical precedent for controversy. In 2017 the Malaysian Bar described as "blatantly unconstitutional" the appointment of the then Chief Justice and President of the Court of Appeal as additional judges under Article 122(1A), which had the effect of keeping them in office beyond the constitutional age limit. The Bar's objections included that Article 122(1A) should be exercised by the current Chief Justice rather than a former one, and that the provision does not provide for additional judges to continue holding the offices of Chief Justice or President of the Court of Appeal under Article 122B(1). The Bar expressly said it did not question the individuals' abilities or suitability.

This article does not adjudicate any of that. Judicial appointment reform is a genuine constitutional debate in Malaysia.

Judicial independence — the protections that exist

• Security of tenure. A Federal Court judge may resign by writing to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong but shall not be removed from office except in accordance with the constitutional provisions — a tribunal process, not executive discretion.
• Remuneration is charged on the Consolidated Fund, provided by Parliament by law, rather than being subject to annual executive discretion.
• Judicial immunity. All judges are immune from suit in the performance of their judicial functions.
• Fixed court numbers, as above.