13 Of 29 MA63 Issues Are Resolved. The Movement That Got Them There Started As A Banner.

In the 2016 Sarawak state election, alongside the banners of contesting parties, an observer noted banners from Sarawak for Sarawakians (S4S). He described it not as a cohesive, organised movement but as "a popular sentiment among many Sarawakians" — the feeling that Sarawak had been short-changed since joining the Federation in 1963.

That sentiment is now government policy on both sides of the South China Sea.

As at the start of 2026, 13 of 29 MA63 issues have been resolved — nine under the current administration and four under the previous one, described by the minister responsible as "the most significant progress on MA63 implementation by any administration to date."

This article is about how that happened: the movement, the parties, the political leverage, and the arguments Malaysians are having about where it ends. For the legal architecture of MA63 itself and the 40% claim, see the companion articles.

1. From sentiment to movement

The grievance is old and economic. Sarawak is endowed with abundant natural resources, yet — as The Diplomat summarised the complaint — much of the generated income was transferred to the peninsula, putting East Malaysia on a different development trajectory.

S4S is dated to around 2012 as the first movement of its kind to gain traction. Its character has always been closer to popular sentiment than organised campaign.

What changed was the political vehicle. In June 2018, following BN's collapse at federal level, its Sarawak components — PBB (Malay and Melanau), SUPP (Chinese), PDP and PRS (both Dayak-focused) — rebranded as Gabungan Parti Sarawak, prioritising state-specific governance under the slogan "Sarawak for Sarawakians" and explicitly distancing themselves from national party dynamics.

GPS's stated ideology centres on enhanced autonomy within the MA63 framework, greater control over resources, and rejecting subservience to federal shifts.

A Universiti Malaya survey conducted June–September 2018 found generally 60 to 70 per cent of Sarawak voters supporting GPS.

2. The 2021 constitutional amendment and the landslide

Two events, four days apart, in December 2021.

First: Parliament's Dewan Rakyat unanimously passed amendments to the Federal Constitution giving recognition to the Malaysia Agreement 1963 — reported as effectively elevating Sarawak and Sabah's status as equal to the Federation of Malay states. This was a long-standing demand.

Then: GPS won 76 of 82 seats in the Sarawak state election — the ruling parties' biggest win in five decades.

Analysts connected them. Sarawak-based analyst Jeniri Amir observed that GPS had won on a nativist "Sarawak First" platform reflecting majority aspirations, though he stressed other factors including a divided and ideologically incoherent opposition. He suggested the amendments' passage days before the poll "could have significantly altered the course of the race."

His warning to Putrajaya was direct: "The federal government has to take note of Sarawak rights and autonomy and not take it for granted. What the state's people want is fair treatment from the federal government and to heed the signal."

3. GE15 — sentiment becomes leverage

This is the moment the movement acquired real bargaining power.

At GE15 on 19 November 2022, GPS secured 23 parliamentary seats and emerged as a pivotal player in a hung Parliament. After initially signalling potential alignment with Perikatan Nasional, GPS endorsed Anwar Ibrahim on 22 November 2022, facilitating the unity government sworn in on 24 November.

Analysis describes that decision as prioritising Sarawak's negotiation leverage over ideological alignment, enabling GPS to extract commitments on MA63 implementation amid federal instability. GPS's participation is characterised as strategic rather than unconditional.

The resulting government comprised PH, BN, GPS, Gabungan Rakyat Sabah and Warisan, securing a two-thirds Dewan Rakyat majority without formal merger.

4. What has actually been delivered

The machinery: the MA63 Implementation Action Council (MTPMA63), chaired by the Prime Minister, with a Technical Committee led by the Deputy Prime Minister. A dashboard for tracking MA63 progress was announced for launch in January 2026.

The count: 13 of 29 issues resolved — nine under the current administration, four under the previous.

Resolved matters identified by Sarawak's Deputy Minister in the Premier's Department (Law, MA63 and State-Federal Relations), Datuk Sharifah Hasidah Sayeed Aman Ghazali:

• transfer of regulatory authority over liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to Sarawak through PETROS
• amendments to Articles 1(2) and 161A of the Federal Constitution
• empowerment of Sarawak's Marine Fisheries Department and Ministry of Food Industry, Commodity and Regional Development to issue deep-sea fishing licences
• formal recognition of Sarawak's JKR and DID
• amendments to the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia Act 1995 (Act 533)
• special guidelines to facilitate the return of reserved land
• amendments to the Sarawak Labour Ordinance (Cap. 76)

Under the current administration, resolutions include recognising the Public Works and Irrigation and Drainage Departments in both states, plus the Sarawak Rural Water Supply Department and Sabah Water Department, as technical departments under Treasury Directive 182.

Sarawak's own measures, taken independently of federal negotiation:

• PETROS, wholly state-owned, formed in 2017
• a 5% state sales tax on all petroleum products, described as a key revenue stream strengthening resource control and fiscal autonomy

5. The two live demands

Sarawak's stated current priorities, per Sharifah Hasidah: finalising the Special Grant formula, and securing an increase in parliamentary seats for Sabah and Sarawak.

On seats. The shared demand is commonly framed as one-third; academic commentary describes the demand as 35% of parliamentary seats and notes it "is not a new claim." Sabah's position was put bluntly by GRS deputy president Pandikar Amin Mulia, noting Sabah has only 25 parliamentary seats against over 100 in West Malaysia.

We could not reconcile the "one-third" and "35%" framings — they appear in different sources and may reflect different formulations of the same underlying demand. Treat the precise figure as unsettled.

On oil and gas — the sharpest current dispute. In a written parliamentary reply on 26 January 2026, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Datuk Seri Azalina Othman Said stated that MA63 does not contain provisions relating to the ownership, management or regulation of oil and gas resources, nor does it define the roles of PETRONAS or PETROS.

The context: Anwar and Sarawak Premier Abang Johari signed a joint declaration in May recognising the PDA and the DGO, but PETRONAS–PETROS negotiations reached deadlock. PETRONAS filed a case at the Federal Court seeking a determination on the legal position of its operations in Sarawak, naming both the Federal Government and the Sarawak state government as respondents. GPS lawmakers voiced dissatisfaction and asked the federal government — as PETRONAS's shareholder — to clarify whether the action was taken at Putrajaya's instruction.

Sarawak holds more than 40% of Malaysia's gas. That is why this dispute matters more than its legal framing suggests.

Other items reported as still outstanding: rights over the continental shelf beyond three nautical miles, the status of English as a state official language, and higher education matters.

6. Where secessionist sentiment sits

This has to be handled precisely, because the range of positions is wide and they are not the same thing.

Three distinct positions:

Autonomy within the federation — the mainstream position, held by GPS and by Sabah's governing coalition. It seeks fuller MA63 implementation, not exit.

Pro-sovereignty sentiment — S4S as described: a popular feeling of having been short-changed, not an organised secession campaign.

Explicit independence advocacy — Parti Bumi Kenyalang (PBK) has taken a radical stance on Sarawak's independence, which academic analysis of the 2021 election describes as stirring "mixed reactions, reflecting strong regional sentiments but also skepticism about its feasibility."

The academic reading. One 2025 study frames Sabah and Sarawak's dissatisfaction over federal dominance, religious centralisation and economic disparities as producing parties reflecting "increasing demands for autonomy or outright independence", and argues that a breakdown in federal consensus, if unaddressed, could catalyse an independence movement — while suggesting that genuine political decentralisation, fiscal reform and cultural recognition could serve as alternatives to secession.

The practical assessment from reporting is more measured: while Sarawakians want more autonomy, they are "willing to live with Putrajaya for now."

On the legal position of secession, we are being deliberately careful. The constitutional status of secession in Malaysia is a contested legal question that we could not resolve to a standard we would publish, and it intersects with the Sedition Act — see (Every Government Since 2012 Has Promised To Repeal The Sedition Act. Cases Rose 84% In 2025.). This article describes what parties and movements advocate; it does not advise on the legality of advocating it. Anyone considering campaigning on this should take legal advice.

7. The arguments, presented fairly

For fuller and faster MA63 implementation:

• Sabah and Sarawak joined on specific conditions designed to safeguard their rights and autonomy, and those conditions were substantially eroded over decades
• The states generate substantial resource revenue while lagging on basic infrastructure — roads, water, electricity
• Parliamentary representation has not kept pace with the founding bargain
• 13 of 29 issues resolved after six decades is, on this view, evidence of how slow the process has been rather than how fast

For caution on the federal side:

• Some demands, including the seats question, require constitutional amendment with a two-thirds majority and affect the balance of the entire federation, not just two states
• The oil and gas dispute involves a national company with national revenue implications and existing contractual positions
• The government's position, as stated in Parliament, is that MA63 itself does not govern oil and gas — so some claims framed as MA63 rights may rest on other legal foundations
• The current administration points to nine issues resolved as the most substantial progress by any government

A point both sides make differently. GPS's leverage came from a hung Parliament. Critics of the process argue that rights should not depend on parliamentary arithmetic; supporters would say that is simply how federal bargaining works.

This article does not adjudicate. These are live political questions on which Malaysians in all three regions hold sincere and differing views.